The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected profits. This has several implications for the equilibrium, the most important being that by setting a modest fee conditional of the order flow, the market maker is able to obtain a profit of the order of magnitude, and even better than, a perfectly informed insider. Our model also indicates why speculative prices are more volatile than predicted by fundamentals.
Introduction
In his seminal paper on insider trading, Albert Kyle (1985) noise trading affect the volatility of prices? What determines the liquidity of a speculative market? He provides answers to these and other questions by modeling rigorously the trading strategy of an insider in a model of efficient price information.
One important feature of a real securities market that remained unexplained in Kyle's analysis is the existence of a bid-ask spread. Kyle focuses on a single auction model in which a risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among three kinds of traders. A single insider has access to perfect, private observation of the ex post liquidation value of the risky asset. Uninformed noise traders trade randomly. Market makers set prices and clear the markets after observing the quantities traded by others.
In the Kyle model the noise traders can be considered as less than fully rational, since they expect to suffer losses equal to the insiders' gains. The market makers set the prices equal to the expected value of the risky asset conditional on the order flow; they are making zero profits. The market makers cannot distinguish the trading of the insider from the trading of the noise traders, who in effect provide camouflage, which enables the insider to make profits on their expense.
The market maker in the standard model has substantial market power, yet does not exploit this to his own advantage when setting the price; the market maker is assumed to be a fiduciary acting in the best interest of market participants.
One may ask how realistic this assumption is. In the testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein laid out the Goldman Sachs perspective on the firm's role in CDO deals related to the 2008 financial crisis. From his answer it seems clear that he does not consider a market maker as a fiduciary agent:
In our market-making function, we are a principal. We represent the other side of what people want to do. We are not a fiduciary. We are not an agent. Of course, we have an obligation to fully disclose what an instrument is and to be honest in our dealings, but we are not managing somebody else's money.
Caveat emptor seems to be Mr. Blankfein's message, and this was also the basis of Goldman's defense against the SEC suit re the Abacus transactions. The case of Goldman Sachs is, we believe, not unique. Investment banks and other financial intermediaries are known to accumulate large fortunes, which should be difficult, or even impossible, if they were just disinterested auctioneers.
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of relaxing the assumption that market makers are fiduciaries. In our model, market makers are economic agents allowed to make a profit. Market makers generate profits by adding a margin to the conditional expected value of the risky asset when they are going short. Similarly they are subtracting a margin when taking long positions. Formally, the margin is a random variable, which is correlated with aggregate demand. Thus, market makers are not just adding or subtracting a fee; the size of the fee depends on trading volume. As in the standard model, informed traders realize what market makers are up to, and take their behavior into account when deciding their own trades. Noise traders just trade, we could allow them to have partial information as in Aase, Bjuland and Øksendal (2012a), but we have chosen to let these agents be uninformed. Despite of this, market makers may make unbounded profits taking advantage of noise traders, which would not make sense. To avoid this outcome a regulator is introduced. Alternatively, the market maker may be assumed to practice restraint in order to keep markets open.
These issues were addressed in a recent paper (Aase and Gjesdal (2017) ), in the setting of a one-period model. It is of interest to extend this analysis to several periods, which we do in this paper, where we consider a continuoustime model.
As in the one-period model our analysis shows, perhaps surprisingly, that for only a moderate correlation with the aggregate demand, the profits of the market maker may exceed that of the perfectly informed insider. In the paper we illustrate the time profiles of these profits. This could serve as one explanation of why so much wealth tends to end up in the hands of financial intermediaries, a timely question that has been asked many times over after the 2008-financial crisis.
Another implication is that the market maker's actions leads to a more volatile price then would be the case if dealings were fair. This may throw some light on the observation made by Campbell and Schiller (1988): Stock market prices display much more volatility than implied by dividends alone. The more recent approach to this problem is to consider the variations in the stochastic discount factor, see e.g., Campbell (1999) . We try to see if the effects of the actions of market makers are substantial enough to explain parts of this problem.
To limit the distortion of prices, a regulatory authority (the SEC) impose an upper bound on price volatility. In our model this limits the degree to which the market maker can perturb the price, and allows us to find an equilibrium in which the insider maximizes profits and the market maker trades "fees". Even if the regulatory constraint limits the market maker's degree of price distortion, still the market maker's profit may exceed that of the perfectly well informed insider. This happens for reasonable degrees of price distortions, a consept developed in the paper.
Our pricing functional is nonlinear, which seems like a popular topic in itself in parts of the extant literature, together with "model uncertainty" and similar issues. In our model the nonlinearity stems from a specific economic assumption, namely that the market maker trades fees. As we know, in neoclassical equilibrium theory prices are linear for a variety of reasons, among others to avoid arbitrage possibilities, which is not an issue here.
There is a rich literature on the one period model, as well as on discrete time insider trading, e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , and others, all adding insights to this class of problems. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) present a different approach, containing similar results to Kyle. Before Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) there is also a huge literature on insider trading in which the insider acts competitively, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
The approach of this article is to study the continuous-time model directly, not as a limiting model of a sequence of auctions, and use the machinery of infinitely dimensional optimization, directional derivatives (or calculus of variations) and filtering theory to solve the problem. We also consider alternatively the stochastic maximum principle in the setting of differential game theory, as well as the Bellman approach in two appendices.
We are able to find the price of the risky asset, the various profits of the participants, all in terms of the insider's trading intensity. The latter we show satisfies an integral equation, that can be solved by an iterative procedure. This we illustrate numerically, by graphs of the the trading intensity, the profits of the agents, and the other key variables developed in in the paper.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is explained in Section 2. The analysis of the continuous time model starts in Section 3, where the mean, the variance and the covariances of the order flow y is derived in Section 3.1, with preliminary expressions for the profit functions of the insider and the market maker. In Section 4 the insider's optimization problem is solved in Theorem 1, resulting in final expressions for the various profit functions, as well as the other quantities of interest. In Section 5 we suggest how the regulator's problem may be solved, in Section 6 we introduce a measure of price informativeness in the market, and present numerical illustrations. Section 7 presents various graphs and computations, which illustrate the key quantities in the paper. This is where we demonstrate our main conclusions. In Section 8 we provide some suggestions for further research, and Section 9 concludes. The paper also contains four appendices.
The Model
At time T there is to be a public release of information that will perfectly reveal the value of an asset; cf. fair value accounting. Trading in this asset and a risk-free asset with interest rate zero is assumed to occur continuously during the interval [0, T ]. The information to be revealed at time T is represented as a signalṽ, a random variable which we interpret as the price at which the asset will trade after the release of information. This information is already possessed by a single insider at time zero. The unconditional distribution ofṽ is assumed to be normal with mean µṽ and variance σ 2 v . In addition to the insider, there are noise (liquidity) traders, and risk neutral market makers. The noise traders are unable to correlate their orders to the insider's signalṽ. Thus the noise traders have random, price-inelastic demands. All orders are market orders and the net order flow is observed by the market maker. We denote by z t the cumulative orders of noise traders through time t. The process z t is assumed to be a Brownian motion with mean zero and variance rate σ 2 t , i.e., dz t = σ t dB t , for a standard Brownian motion B defined on a probability space (Ω, P ). As Kyle (1985) and Back (1992) we assume that B is independent ofṽ. We let x t be the cumulative orders of the informed trader, and define (2.1)
as the total orders accumulated by time t.
The market maker only observes the process y, so he cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed trades. Let F y t = σ(y s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of this process. The risk neutral market maker, assumed to have some degree of monopoly power, sets the price p t at time t as follows (2.2)
where m t = E[ṽ|F y t ] is the "fair value", and u t = k t y t for k t ≥ 0 a deterministic function satisfying k t → 0 as t → T . We assume that k t = (T −t)κ, where κ is a non-negative constant set by the market maker. Clearly E[u t |F y t ] = k t y t . The market maker, the insider and the noise traders all know the probability distribution ofṽ.
We assume that the insider's market order at time t is of the form
where β ≥ 0 is some deterministic function. This form of the market order follows from the discrete time formulation of the problem, assuming the insider maximizes profits, in which case (2.3) follows from the first order condition; x t does not depend on p t since x t is submitted before p t is set by the market makers. Assumption (2.3) is consistent with Kyle (1985) . 1 The function β t is called the trading intensity on the information advantage (v − p t ) of the insider.
The basic assumptions behind this result is (i) profit maximization by the insider, where it is shown in Aase and Gjesdal (2016) that this result still holds when the market maker sets the price as we have assumed in (2.2) above, and (ii) the insider does not condition the quantity he trades on price. Here the insider chooses quantities ("market orders") instead of demand functions ("limit orders").
Assumption (2.2) is our deviation from the standard model. 2 Below we explain why this price setting leads to a positive expected profit for the market maker.
The stochastic differential equation for the total order y t is (2.4)
Aside from the first mean zero 'innovation' term, the equation shows that y t has the structure of a (generalized) mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, oscillating around this mean zero term. Let us denote by S t (β) = E{(ṽ −p t ) 2 } and by γ t (β) = E{(ṽ −m t ) 2 }. Usually the assumption is made that lim t→T − p t = p T =ṽ a.s. This assumption seems natural, ensuring that all information available has been incorporated in the price at the time T of the public release of the information, at which time a price spread cannot be sustained.
In Aase et. al. (2012a) m t = p t for all t ∈ [0, T ], and it was there demonstrated that p t →ṽ as t → T − , and S t (β) → 0 as t → T − as a consequence of the insider following his optimal trading strategy. Here we find it natural to simply assume this, as was done in e.g., Kyle (1985) , so that p t − m t → 0 as t → T − , and both converge toṽ, since k t → 0 by assumption. Denote the insider's wealth by w and the investment in the risk-free asset by b. The budget constraint of the insider can best be understood by considering a discrete time setting, of which the continuous-time model is the limit (in an appropriate sense). At time t the agent submits a market order x t −x t−1 and the price changes from p t−1 to p t . The order is executed at price p t , in other words, x t −x t−1 is submitted before p t is set by the market makers. The investment in the risk-free asset changes by b t −b t−1 = −p t (x t −x t−1 ), i.e., buying stocks leads to reduced cash with exactly the same amount. Thus, the associated change in wealth is (2.5)
In other words, the accounting identity for the wealth dynamics is of the same type as in the standard price-taking model, except for one important difference; while, in the rational expectations model, the number of stocks in the risky asset at time t depends only on the information available at this time, so that both the processes x and p are adapted processes with respect to the same filtration, here the order x depends on information available only at time T for the market makers (and the noise traders). As a consequence of (2.5) we obtain the dynamic equation for the insider' wealth w x s dp s This is not well-defined as a stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation, since p t is F y t -adapted, and x t is not. Thus it needs further explanation. However, since we assume that the strategy of the insider has the form (2.3) for some deterministic continuous function β t > 0, then a natural interpretation of (2.6) is obtained by using integration by parts, as follows:
Alternatively, one might obtain (2.7) by interpreting the stochastic integral in (2.6) as a forward integral. See Russo and Vallois (1993), Vallois (1995, 2000) for definitions and properties and Biagini and Øksendal (2005) for applications of forward integrals to finance.
Similarly we can find the market maker's profit from his price setting operations: His wealth w M from these operations is
When the total initial order y 0 > 0, the market maker has to sell to clear the market and accordingly sets the price p 0 a bit higher than he would have done if he were a fiduciary. Similarly, if y 0 < 0 she must buy to clear the market, so he sets the price p 0 a bit lower than he would if he sets the price fairly. Continuing this practice in every period, he will end up with a positive expected profit, simply because the profit he would have obtained by being fair has zero expectation 3 . Consider the situation where the total initial order y 0 > 0. Because of the mean reverting nature of y towards zero, it is more likely that y 1 < y 0 than the other way around. By the price setting mechanism used by the market maker, it is more likely that p 1 < p 0 than the opposite, in which case the market maker's profit is positive. A similar reasoning holds when y 0 < 0, in which case the market maker buys from the other participants at time zero, and sells the stock in the market at time one at the price p 1 he sets then, based on y 1 − y 0 . Thus, in expectation the market maker's profit is positive.
Notice that the market maker takes some 'overnight' risk, in that, when he must sell to the other participants at time t, he sets the price p t which he sells for, and the next day he sets the price p t+1 , based on the order y t+1 − y t , at which he buys in the market the stock that he 'delivered' the day before. By the price setting mechanism, more likely than the other way he profits from this operation. If he were a fiduciary, he would go even in 'the long run'. Here as a non-fiduciary, in expectation his profit is positive.
By going to the continuous time limit, his wealth at time t is
where [p, y] t is the quadratic covariance process of p and y. Unlike the corresponding expression for the insider, this integral is well-defined in the traditional interpretation, since p t is F y t -adapted, and so is of course y t . Finally, the noise traders' profit is
The stochastic integral t 0 z s dp s is well-defined in the traditional meaning since z t is F B t -adapted, p t is F y t -adapted and F y t ⊃ F B t , and hence, by integration by parts, so is the latter stochastic integral in (2.9).
Since y t = x t + z t and x is of bounded variation, [p, y] t = [p, z] t for all t. Since this is a pure exchange economy, it follows that the sum of the profits is zero with probability one, or, w
3 Some basic analysis.
Returning to the stochastic process for the total order at time t, y t , its representation is given by (2.4), which we repeat here
This is a Gaussian process consisting of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type process, with a normally distributed "innovation" term added to its drift term, the first term on the right-hand side in the above stochastic differential equation.
In order to analyse this model for the total order, we start by rewriting this equation as follows:
If we define
and use Ito's lemma, we obtain the following
Clearly F (y) = F (ỹ) and hence
Therefore we may regard (3.2) as the innovation process of an "observation process"ŷ t defined by
For this to hold, we need to verify that
Suppose (3.5) is proved. Then
is the filtered estimate of v given the observationsỹ s ; s ≤ t. By Theorem 12.1 in [18] or Theorem 6.2.8 in [19] , the filter m t is given by the SDE
, and γ t (β) solves the Riccatti equation
Thus we have a controlled state process
given by the equations (3.4),(3.6) and (3.7).
Rewriting the system in terms of (y t , m t , γ t ) we obtain the following set of equations
The expected profits are
for the market maker and for the insider, respectively.
Let us now return to the problems of the previous section and calculate the profits of various participants in this economy. Towards this end we first need expressions for the mean, the variance and the covariances of the market order process y.
The variance and covariances of the process y.
We start with the variance. Based on the expression in (3.3), we proceed as follows. From equation (3.1) we have by Itô's lemma
From this we deduce that
Observe that This expression will be useful below. We use the notation V (t) := E(y Moving to the covariances E(y t y s ) for any s > t, we proceed as follows. Here we use the notation e(t) := e t 0 krβrdr .
Integrating this from t to s, we get
since the inner conditional expectation is zero. We obtain for s > t
Using the definition ofỹ, we have that
Combining this with our above result (3.13), we conclude that
For s = t we obtain the result in equation (3.13) . The mean of y
We will also need the mean E(y t ) of the process y for any t. Starting with the equation
and letting E(y t ) :=ȳ t , whereȳ 0 = y 0 , by taking expectation in the above equation we obtainȳ
which is an ordinary, linear differential equation inȳ t , with initial condition y 0 = y 0 , the unique solution of which is
In our model y 0 = 0, which implies that E(y t ) = 0 for all
, so the price p t has the correct expectation at all times.
The profit of the insider
Returning to the insider, from equation (2.7) giving the wealth w t of the insider at any time t, since
by our assumption that p t → p T =ṽ, his task is to find the trading intensity β t which maximizes the expected terminal wealth
Later, when we consider the net profit at any time t ∈ [0, T ], we will use the notation p I (t, κ) for the insider's net profit by time t, so that J I (k, β)−w I 0 := p I (T, κ)) with this notation. Similarly for the market maker.
The dilemma for the insider is that an increased trading intensity at some time t will reveal more information about the value ofṽ to the market makers and hence induce a price p t closer toṽ, which in turn implies a reduced insider information advantage. On the other hand she has to trade in order to make any profit at all.
First observe that
since E E(ṽ|F y t )y t = E E(y tṽ |F y t ) = E(ṽy t ), a result similar to the one obtained above, with y t instead of y 2 t . By the definition of γ t (β) = E(ṽ − m t ) 2 , we then obtain the following
since the cross term vanishes by by the above observation. Using the expression for V (t) := E(y 2 t ) given in (3.13), we obtain the following
The insider will now maximize this expression in the trading intensity process β, for a given price perturbation process k by the market maker.
Before we address this problem, we want to find the profit of the insider at any time t ∈ [0, T ], which will allow us to observe the relative time performance of the two profit functions of interest.
Towards this end, let us go back to the expression for the insider's profit at time t given in (2.7). Taking expectation in this equation we obtain
where the second term follows from (3.17) . Consider the last term. The integrand can be written
The second expectation on the right-hand side is Notice that s ≤ t in these computations. The third expectation on the right-hand side of (3.
The last term in (3.18), the covariance, we have already computed in Section 3.1. Since here t ≥ s, we rewrite this formula accordingly, namely as
This means that the insider's profit at any time t in [0, T ] is given by
Observe that as t → T , this profit converges to the expression in (3.16), since both γ t (β) → 0 and k t → 0 then. By use of (3.19) the insider's profit can be written
The problem of finding the optimal value of the insider's trading intensity β t , and the corresponding expression for the profit fundtion is relegated to Section 4 below.
The profit of the market maker
The market maker's expected profit is:
The third equality follows since m is a martingale, the fourth since B t is a F y t -martingale, and the last equality follows since y t is orthogonal to (ṽ −m t ), and the Fubini theorem. Thus we have that this profit can be written
Notice that the profit of the market maker at any time t ∈ [0, T ] is simply
Using the expression (3.13) for V s = E(y 2 s ), we obtain the following expression for this profit: Consider the latter profit. The last term on the right-hand side increases without bounds as k t = (T − t)κ increases without bound for any given t, i.e., as the constant κ → ∞. Surely k t goes to zero as t goes to T , but the constant κ can in principle be set arbitrarily large by the market maker, since she simply decides the value of this constant once and for all. Also we know that β t decreases with κ, but this effect more or less cancels out since the two exponentials where β enters are of different signs.
Likewise, the second term on the right-hand side,
This is illustrated numerically in Figure 2 . The base case parameters are the same as in Figure 1 , where the horizon is T = 10. (Again we have anticipated a bit, and used the optimal values of the function β t appearing is Section 4 below.)
Using the notation for the net profit of the market maker As a result, this model displays similar properties to the one-period model, and a regulator is therefore introduced to limit the price perturbation caused by the market maker trading fees.
This set-up does not become a game between the insider and the market maker in the usual meaning of game theory, in that only the insider maximizes an objective, while the market maker trades fees that depend on the stochastic order flow, i.e., she sets the price to the best of her knowledge, and then adds the fee conditional on observing the order flow. In some sense, the market maker is not strategic in the ordinary interpretation of this term.
As the market maker obtains more information from the order flow, she lets this information be reflected in the price p t . The introduction of trading fees reduces the informational contents of the true value of the asset in the price. The market maker may be assumed to set κ to the maximum value allowed by the regulator, or alternatively, by her own conscience, supposing she practices restraint in order to keep the markets open, whichever gives the smallest value of κ. It is in the interests of the market maker that the market does not break down, in which case she does not make any profits at all, and may also face legal issues. It is, after all, the market maker's task to operate such that the markets function.
The problem of relating the parameter κ to observables in the market is treated in Section 5 below.
Since this is a pure exchange economy, the profit of the noise traders is given by
They will loose in this market.
The insider's problem
We now address the optimization problem of the insider. In our framework he is to determine the trading intensity β t by which he trades at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. We assume he determines this intensity such that his profit J I (k, β) is maximized, taking k as given. Vi have that dp t = dm t + d(k t y t ) = dm t − κy t dt + k t dy t , since the function k t is of bounded variation. From filtering theory (see e.g., Kalman (1960) , Davis (1977-84) , Kallianpur (1980) or Øksendal (2003) , Ch 6) we know that the corresponding conditional expected value m t = E(ṽ|F y t ) is given by
Furthermore the square error function γ t (β) = E(ṽ−m t ) 2 satisfies the Ricatti equation We find it natural to use directional derivatives, or equivalently, variational calculus to solve this problem. Based on this we have the following: Theorem 1. The optimal trading intensity β t of the insider satisfies the following integral equation
where V (t) is the variance process of the order flow y t .
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix 1.
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This integral equation can be solved iteratively, which we demonstrate in Section 7 below.
When κ = 0, the trading intensity is seen to be 5 The problem may alternatively be formulated in terms of a stochastic differential game between the insider and the market market maker, in which case we make use of the stochastic maximum principle. This leaves three adjoint variables (co-variables with shadow price interpretations) to be determined. Alternatively we can formulate the problem as a dynamic programming problem and use the Bellman approach. In this case this leaves us with the indirect profit function to be determined. We indicate these two formulations later (Appendix 2 and 3), without going all the way to the the bitter end. 
The regulator's problem
To limit the distortion of prices, a regulatory authority (the SEC) imposes an upper bound on price volatility. This is by and large the same as limiting the conditional expected degree of price distortion (see Aase and Gjesdal (2018) ). In our model this limits the market maker's freedom to set prices. The market maker in our model is not really strategic, is risk neutral but exercises a certain degree of monopoly, as explained earlier. The regulator is introduced to mitigate this.
As in the standard model, informed traders realize what the market maker is up to, and take his behavior into account when deciding their own trade. Noise traders just trade. In this situation the market maker can make unbounded profits taking advantage of noise traders, which would not make sense. To avoid this outcome the regulator is introduced.
It is well acknowledged that insider trading increases the volatility of an asset. Also price perturbations caused by the market maker's trading fees increase the volatility. This can be utilized by the regulator, who can suspend the stock from further trading based on observing volatility over a certain acceptable, preset limit. A measure of volatility we consider as the basis for the regulator's ability to monitor the market.
The decision variable κ of the market maker has so far "no dimension", meaning that it is not an observable quantity in the market. We therefore seek a connection between this variable and and an observable quantity. This is an important step in the analysis, because it allows us to see if the market maker can really outperform the perfectly well informed insider in terms of profits at reasonable levels of trading fees, i.e., at levels where the regulator has not suspended the security.
From our expressions for the profit functions of the participants, we notice that as κ increases, the market maker's profit grows without limits, see e.g., Figure 2 , and eventually it will dominate the profit function of the insider. The interesting question is then if this takes place at an acceptable level of price perturbations, set by the regulator.
With this in mind, we would like to develop a connection between the decision variable κ and total volatility. Consider the quantity var(p t ) =
E(p t − E(ṽ))
2 . It is closely connected to the mean square deviation
This latter quantity, or its square root, we assume can be observed by the regulator, who will then compare this to the corresponding term γ t (β 0 ) based on no price distortions by the market maker.
Recall the following definitions.
2 where m t = E(ṽ|F y t ). The function γ t (β 0 ) corresponds to the expected square deviation between the true value of the asset and the fiducial price m t , provided the trading intensity β 0 t is used in the computation of the latter quantity. S t is the expected square deviation between the true value of the asset and the actual price that the market maker sets, in the case where she trades fees, as explained. Naturally, S t (β) is larger than γ t (β 0 ), and increasingly so as the market maker's decision variable κ increases.
This leads us to introduce the following quantity in relative terms (rv = relative volatility)
Our assumption that S t := S t (β) is observable by the regulator also means that rv(t, κ) is observable.
From our previous results S t (β) = γ t (β) + k 2 t V t (k), where V (t) depends on k t and is given by equation (3.13), which is . Using these relations, rv(t, κ) can be written .
When κ = 0 we see from this expression that rv(t, 0) ≡ 1. Here rv will give information about the degree to which the market maker trades fees. When κ = 0, the function rv(t, 0) is constant through time and identically equal to 1 as noticed. As κ increases from zero, rv(t, κ) will rise above 1, and indicate the percent-wise increase from the situation with fiducial trade, at every t ∈ [0, T ].
For example, when rv(t, κ) = 1.20, for some t and κ, the actions of the market maker has increased the volatility of the asset by 20% relative to the situation with fiducial price setting, where κ = 0. Thus the quantity rv seems like a reasonable measure of the degree of fee trading, in the hands of a regulator.
In this situation the map from κ to rv, and in particular its inverse mapping, will serve as a guide for acceptable values of κ, given a certain level of rv set by the regulator. This inverse mapping is illustrated in Section 7.5 below 6 . The market maker can, on the other hand, use this mapping to exercise restraint in setting κ in order to keep markets open.
A measure of price informativeness
We now derive a measure of the informativeness in prices, which is of particular interest when the prices are distorted. Consider the quantity ι(t, κ) := 1 − var(ṽ|p t ) var(ṽ) .
When the price carries no private information about the true value of the asset at some time t and some level of distortion κ, the conditional variance equals the unconditional variance, and consequently ι(t, κ) = 0 at this point (t, κ). When the price equals the value of the asset, the conditional variance equals 0 and ι = 1 at this point, in which case all the private information is reflected in the price. Consequently 0 ≤ ι(t, κ) ≤ 1 for all time points t ∈ [0, T ] and for all κ ≥ 0. Because of the joint normal assumption,
where ρṽ ,pt is the correlation coefficient betweenṽ and p t . Consequently ι(t, κ) = ρ 2 v,pt for all (t, κ). In order to find this measure of price informativeness, we need to compute the quantities cov(ṽ, p t ) and var(p t ). To this end, we first consider the covariance. Since p t = m t + k t y t , cov(ṽ, p t ) = cov(ṽ, m t ) + k t cov(ṽ, y t ).
The first term on the right-hand side can be written
since m t is F y t -measurable, where m t = E(ṽ|F y t ) and E(m t ) = µṽ. Furthermore,
by a similar type of conditioning as above. The last equality follows since E(ṽ) = E(m t ) = µṽ. Since we already have an expression for γ t = γ t (β), see equation (4.1), we now have an expression for var(m t ), and hence cov(ṽ, m t ) = var(m t ) = σ 2 v − γ t (β) by the above. The term cov(ṽ, y t ) is calculated as follows: First notice that by iterated expectations cov(ṽ, y t ) = cov(m t , y t ). From the Kalman filter equation we have
see equation (3.9) , and from the binormality between m t and y t and the corresponding projection theorem we obtain the following connection
were ρ mt,yt is the correlation coefficient between m t and y t , σ yt := V (t) and σ mt := var(m t ) = σ 2 v − γ t (β). We have then shown that
where we have formulas for all the terms on the right-hand side of this equation.
It remains to find the variance of p t . Again, from p t = m t + k t y t it follows that
Putting all this together, we have
where var(p t ) is given above in (6.1). From this the informativeness ι in prices is given by
where ρṽ ,pt is calculated using (6.2) and (6.1). Table 1 illustrates the time development of the informativeness in the market. For a given value of the price distortion parameter κ we notice that the informativeness increases with time, see the last row in Table 1 .
In the same table we have also computed some of the other key quantities that is used in the computation of the measure of informativeness ι(t, κ), such as the correlation coefficients ρ mt,yt (t, κ) and ρṽ ,pt (t, κ) and the variances of the price p t and the 'fair' price m t . While ι(t, κ) = ρṽ ,pt (t, κ) 2 and thus ρṽ ,pt (t, κ) represents an equivalent measure of information as ι(t, κ), the correlation coefficient ρ mt,yt (t, κ) is a measure connected to the 'fair' value m t instead of the market price p t , but computed with the value of β t where the insider has optimally adjusted to the actual distortion of the price.
This measure tells us how closely correlated the 'fair' price m t is to the order flow y t . From the table we notice that there can be a high correlation, as in our example, which throws some new light on the market maker's advantage in observing the order flow.
In the example this measure decreases with time up to a certain value t * , then increases after that, so that here the advantage is highest in the beginning and towards the end of the trading interval.
Since the correlation cov(ṽ, m t ) = var(m t ), this covariance also increases slowly with time in our example, which is reasonable since more information about the true value of the asset becomes available with time, hence the increase in the corresponding correlation coefficient ρṽ ,mt = cov(ṽ, m t )/σṽ. At the same time this shows that γ t (β) decreases slowly with time, again for the same reason: One knows more about the true value as time increases, and the present measure of uncertainty (the mean square error) then naturally decreases.
Finally, we illustrate the time development of the variance of the price p t and of the 'fair' price m t . The latter one has just been explained. For the former two different effects are in force: One is that V (t) increases with time (see Section 7.3 below) and what has just been shown, that cov(ṽ, m t ) also increases with time. The other is that k t decreases with time, see the expression (6.1) for the var(p t ). In our example the first effect weakly dominates. Table 1 : The quantity ι(t, κ) as a function of time (κ = 0.035).
The shape of ι(t, κ) as a function of the price distortion parameter κ for a given value of time t is illustrated in the next section, see the last row of Table 2 below. Naturally we expect that ι(t, κ) decreases with κ for any given value of t.
Illustrations of the theoretical results

General
Based on the integral equation (4.3) for trading intensity of the insider, we now present a few illustrations.
First, we indicate how to deal with this integral equation. This equation can be transformed to a differential-integral equation if one so pleases, but we choose to work with the version we have, where we use an iterative procedure.
As a first step we suggest to use a trial solution, β 0 t say, on the right-hand side of this equation, and then find the first approximation, β 1 t , given by the left hand side as a function of this initial solution. A reasonable candidate for the trial solution is of course the solution when κ = 0, which we have in closed form (see (4.5)). Next one continues this procedure, where β 1 (t) becomes the new trial solution in the next step, and so on until convergence. This, of course, requires the right numerical tools.
The trading intensity of the insider
In Figure 3 below we illustrate the time development of the trading intensities of the insider obtained this way, where the upper curve is when κ = 0 and the lower curve is for κ = 0.045. The other base case parameters are the same as in Figure 1 . We choose T = 10 here as well 7 . Fig. 3 : The insider's trading intensities as functions of t. Note that in both cases the insider intensifies her trade towards the horizon. Also, it is reasonable that the lower graph corresponds to the insider's trading intensity when the market maker perturbs the price. The insider, knowing what the market maker is up to, now trades more softly. However, towards the end she picks up trading again, since then the market maker trades fees to a less and less extent as t approaches T .
This type of analysis represents an interesting extension of the analysis in Aase and Gjesdal (2018) , who treat the one period model. In that model the intensity is graphically represented as a decreasing, convex function of the decision variable κ (but there is no time development). In Figure 4 we present two graphs of β(t, κ) in the present continuous model as a function of κ for given t, for two different points in time: t = 5 and t = 9, where the upper curve is for t = 9. These are also seen to be decreasing. Unlike for the one-period model, these graphs are concave for small values of κ and then becomes convex as κ increases. That these graphs are decreasing in κ is in accordance with the results from the one period model: The insider trades more softly the more the market maker perturbs the price.
The variance function of the order flow y
We have already indicated a graph, Figure 1 , illustrating the covariance function of the order flow. Here we study the time development of the variance function V (t), as this quantity enters many of the key expressions in this theory. The base case parameters are the same as before. The variance of the total order flow y t is seen to increase sharply in the beginning, and then flattens out at around t = 3 when κ = 0.24. It is well known from empirical studies that the volatility of the price increases as more relevant information enters the market, since this causes trade to increase. A reasonable model of insider trading should reflect this, and for our model this is illustrated in Figure 5 .
However, note that these variances decrease with κ for any given point t in time. This is illustrated in Figure 6 for t = 1, 5, 9 as κ run from 0 to 0.5. The more the market maker trades fees, the less the insider trades and the lower the variance of the order flow y t . Figure 6 corresponds to t = 9, then t = 5 and the lowest curve is for t = 1.
The two parties' net profits
Now we come to the important part, namely the net profit functions of the two key participants as functions of time. These are illustrated in figures 7 and 8.
In Figure 7 we consider the dynamics of the two net profits as functions of of time, for a given value of the parameter κ. We notice that both profit functions naturally start out low and then increase with time. When κ = 0.045 the insider's profit function cross the market maker's profit from below at around t = 7, and then ends up as the highest of the two at the final time T = 10 8 . Fig. 7 : The two net profits as functions of time. κ = 0.045. In Figure 8 however, where κ = 0.07, the market maker's profit is seen to dominate from the start, and also ends up highest at the final time T = 10. When the market maker further increases κ, her profit function will increase for each value of t, while the profit of the insider will decrease for each t compared to the levels in Figure 8 , (but will still be an increasing function of t for each given value of κ, as in the figures 7 and 8). As a consequence, the market maker outperforms the perfectly well informed insider from about κ = 0.06 onwards. 
When does the market maker's profit dominate?
We now illustrate the regulator's problem through some graphs of the market observable quantity rv. In the first figure we plot rv(t, κ) as functions of κ for some given values of time t. Fig. 9 : rv(t, κ) as a function of κ when t = 0.01, 3.6 and 9.0. The lowest curve in Figure 9 corresponds to t = 0.01, the next lowest to t = 9.0 and the highest curve to t = 3.6. To interpret this figure, imagine that the regulator uses the rule that rv should correspond to less than 15% increase from the fiduciary, ideal situation. This means that the market maker should not increase κ beyond 0.07, at least based on the the three time points in this illustration.
Since this line of reasoning is valid only for some particular values of t, in the next figure we study rv's time development: Figure 11 illustrates the same time picture of rv(t, κ) as in the previous figure, but now for κ = 0.09. With a 15%-regulation rule still in charge, the market would then be shut down and the stock suspended at around t = 1.2, but allowed to reopen at around t = 6.5, and then kept open for the rest of the period. Accordingly, the market maker would be wise to consider a lower value of κ to keep her reputation as a decent professional.
On the other hand, if the regulator used a 21%-rule, the market would stay open all the time for κ = 0.09.
The manner in which we find the inverse map from rv to κ is seen to proceed as follows: For a given value of rv * , say rv * = 1.15, we solve in t and κ the following inequality: sup κ (sup t rv(t, κ)) ≤ d * . Then the 'optimal' value of κ, call it κ * , is the one which satisfies this inequality with equality sign: sup t rv(t, κ * ) = d * . In Table 2 Table 2 : The connection between κ * and rv * with associated net profits.
In Table 2 the insider has the highest net profits, denoted p I (t, κ), for lower values of rv * , and this profit is decreasing with k * . For larger values of rv * , the market maker's profit is the largest of the two. The last row in Table 2 illustrates the informativeness ι(t, κ) in the market as a function of κ when t = 9. It decreases as κ increases. Distorting prices is not informative to the other market participants.
In the above illustrations in the last two figures (figures 10 and 11) it is the market maker who has the highest profits of the two parties. This highlights one of the the main ideas in this paper: In real life we know that market makers actually do not set prices in an entirely fiduciary manner, but rather determine prices in such a way that they make money. In the introduction we explained why this behavior is possible and likely to take place. This is in line with observed behavior in several financial markets, in particular those of the over-the-counter type that we have in mind.
For a modest fee conditional on the order flow, the market maker is able to obtain a profit of the order of the magnitude, or even better than, a perfectly informed insider, showing, among other things, the advantage of observing the order flow. This, we conjecture, may be one explanation why so much money tends to end up in the financial sector of the economy.
Suggestions for further research
In the discrete time paper of Aase and Gjesdal (2017) a situation is analyzed where the market maker has private information as well. This could also be of interest to analyze in the present setting. Thee is supposed to be no information flow between the market making department and the investment department of large financial institutions. But these 'Chinese Walls' -as they are known as -may not be entirely 'watertight'. Compared to the model where the market maker has no privileged information, several new insights were obtained in the above mentioned paper. As expected the well informed insider's profit diminishes since his informational advantage has shrunk. This is because the market maker acts non-strategically with respect to his private information, and allows this information to be reflected into the price. Interestingly the informed market maker may then increase his fees without being detected by the regulator, which in turn increases his profits.
Finally, we could analyze the situation where the market maker's information is public, which can be used to determine the effects of information asymmetry. One major difference, discovered in the above mentioned paper, is that the insider then trades harder when information is public, increasing his own profit and that of the market maker. As another consequence, the market is more efficient. Price distortions are now smaller as a function of the price perturbation parameter allowing the market maker to make higher profits. Thus it pays for him to share his private information with the insider, but the noise traders are then even worse off. This analysis also throws some new light on one 'positive' side of insider trading (aside from the obvious negative aspects which we do not dwell on here); all information arriving to the market generally has a positive effect on efficiency.
In particular, price volatility is shown to increase with informed market maker in the one period model. This is an important aspect of the effect of privileged information on security prices, which may explain the price/dividend puzzle, a feature that should be extend to the multiperiod model (the world is, after all, time continuous).
Conclusions
The dynamic auction model of Kyle (1985) is studied, allowing market makers to maximize profit within regulatory limits by charging time varying, stochastic fees. This has several implications for the equilibrium, the most important being that by perturbing the price by a relatively modest amount, the market maker is able to obtain a profit of the order of magnitude, and even higher than, a perfectly informed insider.
The dynamic aspects of this are analyzed in the paper, and illustrated numerically by examples. The analytical challenge turned out to be the determination of the optimal trading intensity of the insider, when the market maker perturbs the price. The solution was presented in Theorem 1 in Section 4. Based on this result, we were able to discuss a wide variety of problems, like finding the profits of the two parties, the insider and the market maker, the stochastic properties of the order flow, and the informativeness in the market, all quantities as a functions of time and price perturbations. We also indicated how a regulator can monitor the market by observing a measure of relative price volatility, which compares to the corresponding measure with fiducial price setting. This gives a convenient connection between price volatility and price perturbation.
Our analysis indicates why speculative prices are more volatile than predicted by fundamentals. By this method we choose an arbitrary function ξ t ∈ A, a sufficiently rich set in this regard, and define the real function g by g(x) = J I (k, β + xξ); x ∈ R.
Then, assuming β is optimal, g is maximal at x = 0 and hence the first order condition of maximality at β is 
